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ABSTRACT
Privacy policies are unsatisfactory in communicating information to users. Social networking sites (SNS) exemplify 
this, attracting growing concerns regarding their use of personal data, whilst lacking incentives to improve their 
policies. Standardization addresses many of these issues, but is only possible if policies share attributes that can 
be standardized. This investigation assessed the similarity of two attributes (the clauses and the coverage of 
forty recommendations made by the UK Information Commissioner) between the privacy policies of the six most 
frequently visited SNS globally. Similarity was also investigated by looking at whether any recommendations were 
not addressed by all SNS and if there were any themes of information discussed in the policies, but not included 
in the ICO Code. We found that similarity in the clauses was low, yet similarity in the recommendations covered 
was high. This indicates that SNS use different clauses, but to convey similar information. There were a number 
of recommendations which none of the SNS addressed. There were also four themes of information which all six 
SNS addressed, which were not recommended in the ICO Code. This paper proposes the policies of SNS already 
share attributes, indicating the feasibility of standardization at a thematic level currently. Five recommendations 
are made to begin facilitating this.
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1 Introduction
Technological and computational advancements have facilitated
the processing of personal data on a scale like never before.
This dramatic increase in the potential of personal data (Row-
land et al., 2012) has led to concerns over its effect on the pri-
vacy of individuals. To some extent, data protection laws have
been used to strike the balance between the rights of individu-
als to privacy and the ability of organizations to use personal
data (Rowland et al., 2012). One right given to individuals
under the European Union (EU) Data Protection Directive
(DPD) (Parliament and Council., 1995) is the right to infor-
mation about personal data processing. This has led to the
adoption of privacy policies as the de facto means of compli-
ance. However, despite the many benefits of a well-executed
privacy policy, their current role in making data processing
transparent has been heavily criticized (McDonald and Cra-
nor, 2008). The growing concern SNS attract regarding their
use of personal data, and its effect on user privacy (Anderson,
2009), typifies the need for more informative policies. Policies
need to create transparency and at a minimum, effectively com-
municate the information that individuals are legally entitled
to. However, with individuals continuing to use their services,
SNS lack the incentives to make improvements. This is exac-
erbated by the difficulties which creating a concise and legally
compliant policy entail. As a suggestion for improvement, stan-
dardizing the privacy policies of SNS addresses many of these
issues, and begins the groundwork for further improvements
(Cranor, 2012). However, standardization is only possible if
policies share attributes on which standards can be built. Us-
ing thematic analysis [8] and cross-document structure theory
(Aleixo and Pardo, 2008) our research investigates the similar-
ity of the policies of SNS, to answer the following five research
questions:
1. What is the similarity between the privacy policies of
the top six SNS globally, in the clauses they use?
2. What is the similarity between the privacy policies of the
top six SNS globally, in the coverage of forty recommen-
dations, made by the UK Information Commissioners
Office (ICO)?
3. Are there any recommendations of the ICO Code, which
all privacy policies do not address?
4. Are there any themes of information addressed in all the
privacy policies not included in these forty recommen-
dations from the ICO Code?
5. To what extent is standardization possible between the
privacy policies of SNS?
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2 Related Work
2.1 Privacy Policies
Also called privacy notices, privacy policies are the explana-
tions individuals are given when information is collected about
them (Office., 2010). Whilst this paper focuses on EU and UK
law (and policies of US-based companies), privacy policies are
not a concept exclusive to these states. Indeed, the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
(an international forum of 34 democracies) has identified ‘open-
ness’ as a principle of good practice when processing personal
data (Economic Cooperation and Development., 2013). Pri-
vacy policies are often the manifestation of this principle by
its members, some of which have incorporated it into their na-
tional law. However, despite their common usage, the role of
privacy policies in informing users is unsatisfactory. They have
been heavily criticized for being long (McDonald and Cranor,
2008), legalistic, complex (Office., 2010) and ineffective in help-
ing users understand their rights. The result is that they are
not read, defeating their purpose. Arguably, organizations are
complicit in this, as with individuals still using their services,
they lack strong incentives to improve their policies. Even if
incentivized, creating a concise and compliant policy is not
easy, given the supranational nature of the web, where data
is processed in numerous jurisdictions, each with differing re-
quirements (Rowland et al., 2012). However, if executed well,
privacy policies can promote transparency and reduce informa-
tion asymmetry [49] by communicating information that en-
ables users to make effective privacy choices. Indeed, evidence
suggests users are privacy aware and active (Hargittai et al.,
2010), just that they do not view privacy policies as a means
of expressing consent [39].
2.2 Social Networking Sites
Various types of websites, from search engines to e-commerce
sites, would benefit from improved privacy policies. However,
for this investigation, we chose to select one ‘type’ of website to
investigate. Social Networking Sites (SNS) were chosen as they
are the second most frequently visited ‘type’ of website globally
(behind search engines) (Alexa., 2014). A product of Web 2.0,
SNS allow users to upload and share content, and an influen-
tial factor in their popularity is that they are free to use [44].
However, as businesses, the trade-off for free use is the data
harvested from users, which can be monetized to support the
provision of the service. Despite this trade-off, a 2011 survey
[45] found that 72% of SNS users worry that they are giving
away too much data online. Indeed, it is not just the data
that users knowingly share, or the data observed without their
awareness that SNS can access, but also the information that
SNS can derive and infer about users from seemingly innocu-
ous data. A 2013 study found that Facebook ‘likes’ (which
were publicly available by default at the time, through Face-
book’s API) could be used to accurately predict a variety of at-
tributes about an individual, including ethnic origin, religious
beliefs and sexual orientation [31]. This issue has also been
recognized by an OECD roundtable of 65 privacy experts from
around the world. Experts were from governments, privacy
enforcement authorities, academia, businesses and the Inter-
net technical community. They acknowledged that ‘increasing
amounts of data are not collected from the individuals con-
cerned, but are instead observed, derived and inferred’ [36].
Therefore, although SNS rely on personal data, it is question-
able how much data this entitles them to. Especially given the
criticisms they have received regarding their collection and use
of personal data [3]. Thus, SNS are a prime example of the
need for more informative policies. Improving their ability to
communicate information about the collection and use of per-
sonal data would support users in making better judgments on
how much information they are willing to give away for use of
these services.
2.3 Suggested Improvements
The question then, is how best to improve privacy policies, and
various suggestions have been made. Becker et al (Becker et al.,
2014) looked at using visualizations for certain aspects of the
policy, to aid communication and improve trust. Another sug-
gestion is taking an approach similar to the creative commons
model for intellectual property rights licences (Robinson et al.,
2009). Alternatively, a technical approach could be taken, such
as making policies machine-readable, as was the aim of the Plat-
form for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [10]. Developed
and officially recommended by W3C in 2002, P3P 1.0 provides
a markup language for websites to use to encode their natural
language privacy statements into a machine-readable XML for-
mat (Olurin et al., 2012). The P3P User agent was then able to
translate a website’s P3P policy into a human-readable format
and check the policy against user preferences. If there was a
conflict, warnings were provided (Olurin et al., 2012). However,
P3P only achieved limited adoption (Olurin et al., 2012) due to
its complexity (Schwartz, 2009), and the lack of industry partic-
ipation (Cranor, 2012). This led to closure of the P3P working
group in 2006 (Cranor, 2012). Yet, some believe P3P-based
techniques have considerable potential, with the challenge be-
ing to design formalized privacy policy languages (Olurin et al.,
2012).
2.4 Standardization
Thus, as a suggestion for improvement, standardization has the
most potential here, offering benefits to various stakeholders
as well as beginning the groundwork for other improvements.
Indeed, a United States of America (US) Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) report (Commission., 2010) called for privacy
policies to be clearer, shorter and more standardized. Bene-
fits of standardization to users include the facilitation of com-
parisons between different policies, increasing familiarity with
terminology, and the location of particular information (Cra-
nor, 2012). Studies have also shown that standardized pre-
sentations can have significant positive effects on a reader’s
enjoyment of privacy policies compared to non-standardized
presentations [30]. Benefits for organizations include allowing
them to verify their compliance with the law (Cranor, 2012)
and a reduction in the hassle of creating policies completely by
themselves. Although these benefits may not incentivize orga-
nizations to improve their policies in the same way consumer
demand would, they do reduce the deterrents or roadblocks
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to doing so. Standardization also allows for large-scale anal-
ysis of policies (Cranor et al., 2013). This allows regulators
s compliance, gain a better understanding of policies, and to
move away from human annotation, which is currently required
to understand and compare policies. Standardizing elements
of policies also begins the groundwork for other suggested im-
provements. It begins the process of information reduction and
refinement, which is required to develop formalized privacy pol-
icy languages (Olurin et al., 2012), or standardized descriptions
for a creative commons model approach [39]. However, to suc-
ceed, standardization requires policies to share attributes, upon
which standards can be built. Given the fragmented evolution
of the privacy policies of SNS, in their creation by different
organizations, governed by differing jurisdictional legal require-
ments, the shared attributes required for standardization may
not be present. Thus, prior to attempting standardization, it
is important to assess similarity of the data in question, to as-
certain whether standardization is possible, at what level, and
where the similarities and differences between the privacy poli-
cies lie.
2.5 Comparative Analysis of Privacy Policies
There is not a vast amount of literature on comparing privacy
policies (of SNS or otherwise), but one study that did was by
Wu et al (Wu et al., 2010). Here, the researchers adapted a pri-
vacy taxonomy previously used for data storage policies, and
extended it to SNS. They applied the taxonomy to the poli-
cies of six SNS (Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, Orkut, Twit-
ter, and YouTube) to compare how the published policies pro-
tected user privacy in reality. Based on the taxonomy, Wu et
al (Wu et al., 2010) asserted that privacy policies are formed
by four elements: purpose, visibility, granularity and retention
(of the data). However, despite adaptation, this taxonomy was
still primarily aimed at providing a means for thinking about
data privacy technologically (and specifically for data reposito-
ries) (Barker et al., 2009), opposed to legally. The taxonomy
elements were created from principles of handling data from
various sources, rather than from concrete legal requirements.
Given that one of the main benefits of a standardized policy
is to help organizations comply with the law, this is also likely
to also be a huge incentive for the adoption of such a policy.
Therefore, finding similarity with a complete set of elements
indicating legal compliance is more appropriate for supporting
conclusions about the potential for a legally compliant stan-
dardized privacy policy.
2.6 Information Commissioner’s Office Code
The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is an inde-
pendent authority, set up to uphold information rights in the
public interest in the UK. In an effort to help make policies
more informative, ICO has issued a ‘Privacy notices code of
practice’ (Office., 2010) aimed at helping organizations ‘collect
and use information appropriately by drafting clear and gen-
uinely informative privacy notices’. The ICO Code has been
released as part of the Information Commissioner’s role, as
head of ICO, under section 51 of the UK Data Protection Act
(DPA) (Britain., 1998). The DPA is the implementation of the
EU Data Protection Directive (DPD) (Parliament and Coun-
cil., 1995) in the UK. This section requires the Information
Commissioner to promote good practice and empowers him/her
(after consultation) to prepare such codes. The ICO Code pro-
vides recommendations, aimed at aiding those processing infor-
mation in complying with the DPA (Britain., 1998). The ICO
Code itself states that it can be used as a ‘checklist to evaluate
an existing privacy notice’, which is why its recommendations
were chosen as one of the attributes for this investigation. Com-
paring the policies for the presence of these recommendations is
more appropriate for supporting conclusions about the poten-
tial for a legally compliant standardized policy, than comparing
them for the elements used in the Wu et al. (Wu et al., 2010)
study alone. Whilst the four elements Wu et al. (Wu et al.,
2010) used are reflected in the ICO Code, the Code provides
further, more specific recommendations, to aid compliance with
UK (based on EU) law.
3 Methodology
3.1 Selection of the SNS
The most frequently visited SNS were chosen, as ranked by
Alexa.com (Alexa., 2014), a web analytics website that pub-
lishes a global traffic rank for major websites. As these SNS
are used the most, any improvement to their policies has the
potential to benefit the most individuals. Alexa allows visitors
to browse websites by ‘category’ and their category ‘Social Net-
working’ was used for the purpose of this investigation. Due
to the time available in which to manually analyze the data, a
limited number of SNS could be chosen. In deciding how many
to investigate, we found that the top five SNS were also ranked
in the top thirty of all websites globally. Whereas, the sixth
ranked SNS (Flickr), was ranked 164th. Because there was such
a steep drop in the popularity of the ranked SNS, from the 5th
to the 6th (and onwards), it seemed rational (given the time
available) to investigate the top five ranked SNS in addition to
the 6th. This would account for any confounding variables that
might be linked to popularity. The 7th ranked SNS onwards
were therefore excluded from the investigation. As a result,
the six SNS policies selected were: Facebook (FB) (Facebook.,
2013), Twitter (T) [50], LinkedIn (L) (LinkedIn., 2014), Pinter-
est (P) (Pinterest., 2014), Google+ (G+) (Google., 2014), and
Flickr (F) (Flickr., 2015). Their policies as available in August
2014 were analyzed.
Alexa (Alexa., 2014) does not provide exact metrics on
the number of users worldwide, instead ranking sites by traffic
estimates based on data from their global traffic panel. Their
global traffic rank is a measure of how a website is doing relative
to all other sites on the web over the past three months. It is cal-
culated using a proprietary methodology that combines a site’s
estimated average of daily unique visitors and its estimated
number of pageviews over the past three months. Indeed, find-
ing comparable and exact numbers of SNS users worldwide
is not easy. This is because the definition of ‘users’ can be
broken down into subcategories, such as ‘registered users’ (i.e.
people who simply ‘have’ an account) and ‘active users’ (i.e.
people who have an account and use it). Furthermore, ‘ac-
tive users’ can be defined using different parameters. Statista
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SNS Alexa
Rank
Year
of Re-
lease
Headquarters Location
FB 1st 2004 Menlo Park, California, US
T 2nd 2006 San Francisco, California,
US
L 3rd 2003 Mountainview, California,
US
P 4th 2010 San Francisco, California,
US
G+ 5th 2011 Mountainview, California,
US
F 6th 2004 San Francisco, California,
US
Table 1: Details of SNS
(statista., 2016) detail the number of active users worldwide
as of January 2016 for four of the SNS investigated: Facebook
(1550 million); Twitter (320 million); LinkedIn (100 million);
and Pinterest (100 million). However, they do not provide
numbers for Google+ and Flickr. Finding user numbers for
these for the same period and using the same ‘user’ definition
is difficult. Flickr stated in June 2015 [20] that they have a
‘community of more than 112 million photographers’. How-
ever, this figure is not for the same period, and also does not
say how it was measured. If it is the number of registered
accounts, it is not comparable to statista’s figures. Even if
it is for ‘active users’, it cannot be deemed comparable with-
out details of the parameters used to calculate this, which are
not listed. The effect of how ‘user’ is defined is exemplified
in the context of Google+. This is because for every Google
account created, a Google+ profile is created automatically.
Thus, counting ‘registered users’ could reflect even less about
the user base of Google+ than other SNS. Indeed, a digital
marketing firm (Consulting., 2015) analyzed 516,246 randomly
selected Google+ profiles and found that 90.1% of these had
never posted anything on the service.
3.2 Extent of the Data
Online privacy policies often take a layered approach and use
hyperlinks to link to further explanatory information. For
example, within their policy, LinkedIn stated that ‘You may
choose the parts of your profile that search engines index or
completely opt out of this feature in your LinkedIn account
settings’. When clicked, ‘settings’ redirects the user to their ac-
count settings. For this investigation, we had to decide whether
the content we assessed for similarity would extend to the in-
formation contained on the pages following these hyperlinks
(second layer). At the familiarization stage of the investigation
(Stage 1), we examined the hyperlinks. However, we found
that they were generally links to: more advice on the topics
discussed (from the SNS itself and outside sources); links to
account settings and other pages on the website; other SNS
policies; other SNS services; and online contact forms. Further-
more, ICO have stated that when using a layered approach, the
first layer of a privacy policy should contain the ‘key privacy in-
formation’ with ‘more detailed information available elsewhere’
(Office., 2016), opposed to new information. Therefore, we took
a pragmatic approach and examined only the ‘first layer’ of the
policies i.e. the content on the page when their ‘privacy policy’
or ‘privacy’ links were clicked.
3.3 Attributes for Comparison
With the aim of the investigation being to measure similarity
as a precursor to standardization, it was important to select
the appropriate attributes to measure. In terms of granular-
ity, the clauses used by the SNS proved appropriate, as they
convey enough information to make comparison meaningful. A
‘clause’ is defined as ‘a part of a treaty, law or contract’ (Press.,
2011). Whilst it may be useful for other investigations to com-
pare how many times the word ‘privacy’ appears, here it would
not provide a meaningful measure of similarity upon which the
potential for standardization could be assessed. For compar-
ison, a second attribute was also measured for similarity, the
coverage of forty recommendations from the ICO ‘Privacy no-
tices code of practice’ (Office., 2010).
Because the world is divided into legal jurisdictions, we wanted
to select one jurisdiction from which we could extract an appro-
priate subset of legal recommendations. The EU proved inter-
esting, because of its single law (DPD) aimed at harmonizing
data protection laws throughout EU member states. This law
means that findings in relation to one EU country should be
more generalizable to other countries within the EU, than to
those outside. However, implementations of the DPD some-
times differ between member states, who decide the means to
achieve the DPD’s aims. In fact, the implementations of the
DPD’s information obligation has varied significantly in terms
of what information should be provided, in what form, and
at what time (Office., 2010). Because of this, we decided to
pick one member state’s legislation to examine. Whilst any
could have been chosen, the UK seemed appropriate. This
was because the researchers were familiar with its legislation
and aware that ICO had produced specific guidance aimed at
creating legally compliant privacy policies. Furthermore, com-
paring the US privacy policies with legal requirements from a
jurisdiction where they are not headquartered provides for an
interesting juxtaposition. Conclusions about the possibility of
a global standardized policy will be strengthened where simi-
larity between policies originating from the US and recommen-
dations for compliance based on UK and EU law can be found.
Because the UK and US are both members of the OECD, who
have identified ‘openness’ as a principle of good practice (Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development., 2013), they could be
predisposed to similarities. However, both have very different
policy contexts. The US currently has no single comprehensive
federal (national) law regulating data protection. Whilst, the
US FTC’s Fair Information Practice Principles (Commission.,
2000) have significantly shaped how privacy policies are written
by US web companies, specific guidance on policies equivalent
to ICO’s (in stating exactly what they should contain) is often
sector-based. For example, the model privacy form (Securities
and Commission., 2009) for compliance with the US Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act is aimed at financial institutions, as this is
An Extended Investigation of the Similarity Between Privacy Policies of Social Networking Sites 35
whom the Act regulates. These differences are another reason
why investigating the similarities is interesting, but also why
ICO’s sector neutral guidance is appropriate. As the UK was
the chosen, the ICO Code provided the most appropriate set
of recommendations for this investigation. As the independent
body charged with upholding information rights in the UK,
ICO’s guidance should lead to compliance with UK law.
3.4 Measuring Similarity
A combination of thematic analysis and cross-document struc-
ture theory (CST) were used. Thematic analysis (Braun and
Clarke, 2006) is used to pinpoint, examine and record themes
within data, and occurs in the six standard stages of thematic
analysis outlined below. More detail is included in each stage,
to discuss how these stages were adapted for this investigation.
Cross-document structure theory (CST) (Aleixo and Pardo,
2008) is a formal discourse theory for multi-document analy-
sis, which establishes relationships among segments of different
documents about the same topic. CST has two classification
scenarios, binary and full. Binary classification is simply inter-
ested in the existence of cross-document relations, regardless
of type. Whereas, full classification cares about the type of
cross-document relationship. For this investigation, only bi-
nary classification was completed. The coding and analysis in
Stages 1-5 was completed by the primary researcher only, based
on a framework agreed by all researchers. The coding and anal-
ysis was then discussed with the other researchers to produce
the Stage 6 Final Report. Similarity for both attributes was
measured using Jaccard’s similarity coefficient, a statistic used
for comparing the similarity of sample sets. It is defined as the
size of the intersection divided by the size of the union of the
sample sets (Jaccard, 1912).
3.5 The Six Stages of Thematic Analysis
Stage 1: Familiarization with data: Here researchers im-
merse themselves in the data, gaining familiarity with its depth
and breadth (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thus, the policies were
read multiple times, first passively then actively, recognizing
meanings and patterns to support the subsequent phases of
analysis.
Stage 2: Generating Initial Codes: This phase in-
volved the production of initial ‘codes’ from the data. ‘Codes’
are defined as ‘the most basic segment of the raw data that
can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon’
(Boyatzis, 1998). Unlike some legal documents, which are bro-
ken down into numbered clauses, privacy policies are only bro-
ken into sections, which meant that the clauses had to be identi-
fied for the purpose of this investigation. As the thematic analy-
sis definition of ‘code’ and the (above) definition of ‘clause’ were
compatible, this stage was used to identify the atomic clauses
in the policies. The policies were initially divided into sentences
and beginning with Facebook (as the longest policy), a table
was created, initially treating each sentence as a clause. Sen-
tences were then examined to see whether multiple sentences
needed to be combined to form a clause, or whether multi-
ple clauses were contained within one sentence. The clauses
resulting from this formed the initial list of clauses. Here a
technique from CST was introduced and sentence pairs were
examined (Ryan and Bernard, 2003), similar to the thematic
analysis ‘compare and contrast’ approach (Glazer, 1978). All
other policies were also split into sentences and each sentence
‘pair’ was compared, individually asking each time:
• What is the sentence about?
• What question is it trying to answer?
• Is it equivalent to the examined clause in these respects?
• Would adding or subtracting information from the same
privacy policy make the clause equivalent?
Once all the policies had been worked through and all sen-
tence pairs compared, the table containing the allocated clauses
was repeatedly checked, until no more clauses were moved,
known as achieving theoretical saturation (Strauss, Corbin, et
al., 1990). As a result of breaking the policies down into atomic
clauses, each clause could only be coded once (i.e. only be
classed equal to one other clause), unlike other applications of
thematic analysis, which code individual extracts of data into
numerous codes. Also during this stage, some information from
the policies was removed, such as duplicate clauses in the same
policy, sub-headings mentioned in the body of the text and
sentences preceding lists. For example, the subheading ‘your
information’ was removed from Facebook’s policy when the first
line in the section began ‘your information is’. However, ‘In-
formation for users outside the United States and Canada’ was
left in because following this, only contact information was pro-
vided. So the subheading was required for context. The logic
of removing these was to normalize the data. Including them
could inflate the number of clauses some SNS had and skew the
results. Jaccard’s similarity coefficient was then used to mea-
sure similarity between the clauses for the answer to research
question 1.
Stage 3: Searching for Themes Among Codes: This
phase re-focuses the analysis at broader themes, and here in-
volved sorting the clauses into potential themes (Braun and
Clarke, 2006). Rather than coding inductively (initially) to pro-
duce themes from the clauses, forty ICO Code (Office., 2010)
recommendations were used as themes, into which the data
was placed for the purposes of research questions 1-3. The
ICO Code states that it can be used as a list for organizations
to check their privacy policies against, so it was parsed manu-
ally and forty-six recommendations were identified (using the
processes in Stages 1 and 2). Although forty-six were identi-
fied, six were too broad or vague to assess in the context of
this investigation e.g. ‘Any further information necessary, in
the specific circumstances, to enable the processing in respect
of the individual to be fair’. These six were removed, leaving
forty themes for analysis. Each one of the clauses from Stage
2 was then placed into at least one of the forty code recom-
mendations, or into a category of ‘miscellaneous’. To create
an objective description of what it meant to ‘address’ a Code
recommendation, we created a table containing the recommen-
dation and a definition for thematic coding. Table 2 shows
three examples of Code recommendations and their definitions,
which formed the thematic codes.
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As the focus of this investigation was to see whether the
policies contained clauses addressing the recommendation, we
did not investigate whether the SNS was legally complying with
them. For example, one of the forty ICO code recommenda-
tions was: ‘Obtain assurances (in form of written agreements)
from any organizations you share personal information with
about what they will do with the information and what the ef-
fect on people is likely to be’.
Two clauses coded into this recommendation from LinkedIn’s
policy were:
• ‘These third-party developers have either negotiated an
agreement to use LinkedIn platform technology or have
agreed to our self-service API and Plugin terms in order
to build applications (“Platform Applications”)’.
• ‘Both the negotiated agreements and our API and Plu-
gin terms contain restrictions on how third parties may
access, store, and use the personal information you pro-
vide to LinkedIn’.
Although this meant that LinkedIn had included informa-
tion in its policy ‘addressing’ the recommendation, it would
take further investigation (outside the scope of this paper) to
assess whether the assurances obtained are legally compliant.
There are two reasons why this type of in-depth legal analy-
sis is outside the scope of this study. Firstly, because of the
time it would take to complete such an analysis on compliance
with each of the forty recommendations. Secondly, because
that was not the aim of this study, which is to assess similarity
as a potential for standardization. Future work will explore
areas identified in this study upon which further in-depth legal
analysis would be beneficial.
The reason we chose not to code inductively (and produce
themes from the clauses) for the first part of this stage is that
the purpose here was to assess similarity with the long-term
aim of creating a standardized policy. Because one of the main
benefits of a standardized policy for organizations is to help
them comply with the law, this is likely to be a huge incentive
in their adoption of such a policy. Thus, a standardized pol-
icy will be impotent unless it aids organizations in compliance
with the law. So whilst generating themes from the policies
may be useful at later stages (as discussed in Section 6), here
we wanted to see how well the recommendations could be used
as a framework for the policies in their current form. It could
be argued that coding the clauses into the recommendations
risks creating a circular argument in the research design. Ergo,
because the aim of the recommendations is to address the law,
you would expect to find them in the policies. However, as
studies (Van Alsenoy et al., 2015), experience and indeed our
results in Section 4.3 show, this is not always the case. Further-
more, the juxtaposition of US policies being compared with UK
(based on EU) law may also mean this is not the case. Thus,
by coding the clauses into ICO Code recommendations, we can
identify any recommendations warranting further investigation,
due to their lack of presence in the policies. Once this coding
was completed, the ‘miscellaneous’ category contained a num-
ber of clauses, which could not be allocated to an ICO Code
recommendation. We then coded inductively on these clauses.
This identified themes that the policies included, above and
ICO Code
Recommen-
dations
Definition
For The-
matic Cod-
ing
Example of Clause
Tell people
how long
you or other
organisations
intend to
keep the
data.
The privacy
policy refers
to how long
it (or organ-
isations it
shares the
data with)
intend to
keep the
data for.
“Typically, informa-
tion associated with
your account will
be kept until your
account is deleted".
Facebook
Tell people
who their
informa-
tion will
be shared
with/disclosed
to.
The privacy
policy ad-
vises who
users infor-
mation will
be shared
with/disclosed
to.
“Secret boards are
visible to you and
other participants
in the board, and
any participant may
choose to make the
contents of the board
available to anyone
else." Pinterest
Tell people
the purpose
for using the
information.
The privacy
policy tells
the user the
purpose for
using the
information.
If you email us,
we may keep your
message, email ad-
dress, and contact
information) to re-
spond to your re-
quest Twitter
Table 2: Examples of ICO Code Recommendations
beyond the ICO Code recommendations. This provided the
answer to research question 4. These results identified areas
for future work, to understand why these were not present in
the ICO Code, and what the implications of these exceptions
are. Jaccard’s similarity coefficient was then used to measure
similarity between the policies for the answer to research ques-
tion 2.
Stage 4: Reviewing Themes: This stage involves two
levels. Level one involves reading the collated clauses for each
theme and considering whether they form a coherent pattern
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). If not, the researcher considers
whether the theme is problematic or whether the data simply
does not fit there, in which case, the theme can be re-worked.
Level two involves a similar process, but in relation to the whole
data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Because the themes used
here were pre-determined from the ICO Code, at this stage
each clause that had been allocated to a recommendation was
checked for coherence. As were the themes generated from the
‘miscellaneous’ clauses.
Stage 5: Defining and Naming Themes: This stage
names themes and paraphrases their content, clearly defining
what themes are, and what they are not (Braun and Clarke,
2006). As the themes were pre-determined recommendations,
they were simply named as their recommendation in full. The
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thematic codes we had already produced (examples provided
in Table 2) were used as their definitions. For the themes
generated from the ‘miscellaneous’ clauses’, these were named
and defined, and are discussed below in Section 4.4.
Stage 6: Producing the Final Report: Here, the story
of the data is told, and this can be found in the next three
sections.
4 Results and Analysis
Table 3 displays the results from Stage 2, and shows that Face-
book and LinkedIn ’s ‘first layer’ included significantly more
clauses than the other SNS. Google (ranked third in descend-
ing order of number of clauses) had less than half the number
of LinkedIn (ranked second). Interestingly, there is no direct
relationship between the number of clauses identified and the
number removed, indicating that increased policy length did
not necessitate repetition. Table 3 also shows that the de-
scending order of SNS in terms of number of clauses identified
and number of clauses remaining, stays the same (Facebook,
LinkedIn, Google+, Twitter, Pinterest, Flickr). However, the
order varies in terms of the number and percentage of clauses
removed. Flickr in particular had just over a quarter of clauses
removed. Given only 89 were identified initially (the lowest),
this is a significant amount.
FB P T F L G Total
No.
Clauses
479 106 131 89 384 186 1375
No.
Clauses
Removed
141 19 23 23 150 33 389
%
Clauses
Removed
29.44 17.92 17.56 25.84 39.06 17.74 28.29
Remaining
No. Of
Clauses
338 87 108 66 234 153 986
Table 3: Number of Clauses identified, removed and remaining
4.1 Similarity in Clause Coverage
Figure 1 shows evidence of a power-law relationship between
the number of clauses, and how many policies they appear in.
Generally, as the number of clauses examined increases, the
number of SNS they can be found in decreases. Although,
there is an increase (rather than decrease) in the number of
common clauses as the number of SNS increases from five to
six, few empirical phenomena obey power laws for all values
(Clauset et al., 2009). In answering research question 1 (Sec-
tion 1), Table 4 shows that the similarity between the SNS in
the clauses they use was low, with the range between 8-27%.
The least similar were Flickr and Facebook with 8% similar-
ity and the most similar were Pinterest and Twitter with 27%
similarity. Average similarity was 15%. Interestingly, Table 3
shows that Flickr and Facebook were at separate ends of the
continuum in terms of number of clauses identified, with Face-
book having the most and Flickr the least. This may explain
their dissimilarity. Whereas, Table 3 shows that Pinterest and
Twitter would sit next to each other on this continuum, with
a similar number of clauses. This may indicate why they have
a higher similarity.
The investigation highlighted three prominent reasons for dif-
ferences between SNS in the clauses they used:
1. Functionality: Differences in the functionality offered
between SNS, such as LinkedIn’s use of Polls and Face-
book’s ‘Instant Personalization’, resulted in a number of
clauses communicating information about these. Other
SNS would not include these clauses within their policy,
because they do not offer the functionality. Therefore,
they would not need to communicate information about
these.
2. Semantics: Different words were often used between
policies to discuss the same topics, but without being
defined. For example, when discussing the termination
of an account, the words ‘close’, ‘delete’ and ‘deactivate’
were all used across different policies. Whilst Facebook
confirmed ‘delete’ meant permanent deletion, Pinterest
only stated users had the ability to ‘close your account at
any time’. Without defining what ‘close’ meant, it was
difficult to ascertain whether the clauses were compara-
ble, meaning that they had to be treated as different.
3. Elaboration: Some SNS elaborated on certain topics
more than others. For example, although all SNS in-
cluded a link to follow if users had any questions, com-
ments or complaints, some also included their physical
address and information regarding the complaints/question
procedure. Equally, SNS provided definitions and exam-
ples of varying length and content for technical terms.
For example, only Pinterest and Twitter elaborated on
the definition of cookies to mean ‘persistent’ and ‘ses-
sion’ cookies, which resulted in additional clauses, not
present in other policies.
SNS FB P T F L G+
Facebook
(FB)
0.09 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.10
Pinterest (P) 0.27 0.18 0.13 0.19
Twitter (T) 0.17 0.21 0.19
Flickr (F) 0.11 0.15
LinkedIn (L) 0.13
Google+
(G+)
Table 4: Jaccard Similarity of Clause Coverage
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Pinterest, Flickr). However, the order varies in terms of the 
number and percentage of clauses removed. Flickr in 
particular had just over a quarter of clauses removed. Given 
only 89 were identified initially (the lowest), this is a 
significant amount.
Table 3: Number of clauses identified, removed and remaining
4.1 Similarity in Clause Coverage 
Graph 1 shows evidence of a power-law relationship 
between the number of clauses, and how many policies 
they appear in. Generally, as the number of clauses 
examined increases, the number of SNS they can be found 
in decreases. Although, there is an increase (rather than 
decrease) in the number of common clauses as the number 
of SNS increases from five to six, few empirical 
phenomena obey power laws for all values [9]. 
In answering research question 1 (Section 1), Table 4 
shows that the similarity between the SNS in the clauses 
they use was low, with the range between 8-27%. The least 
similar were Flickr and Facebook with 8% similarity and 
the most similar were Pinterest and Twitter with 27% 
similarity. Average similarity was 15%. Interestingly, Table 
3 shows that Flickr and Facebook were at separate ends of 
the continuum in terms of number of clauses identified, 
with Facebook having the most and Flickr the least. This 
may explain their dissimilarity. Whereas, Table 3 shows 
that Pinterest and Twitter would sit next to each other on 
this continuum, with a similar number of clauses. This may 
indicate why they have a higher similarity.
The investigation highlighted three prominent reasons for 
differences between SNS in the clauses they used: 
1. Functionality: Differences in the functionality offered 
between SNS, such as LinkedIn’s use of Polls and 
Facebook’s ‘Instant Personalization’, resulted in a number 
of clauses communicating information about these. Other 
SNS would not include these clauses within their policy, 
because they do not offer the functionality. Therefore, they 
would not need to communicate information about these. 
2. Semantics: Different words were often used between 
policies to discuss the same topics, but without being 
defined. For example, when discussing the termination of 
an account, the words ‘close’, ‘delete’ and ‘deactivate’ 
were all used across different policies. Whilst Facebook 
confirmed ‘delete’ meant permanent deletion, Pinterest 
only stated users had the ability to ‘close your account at 
any time’. Without defining what ‘close’ meant, it was 
difficult to ascertain whether the clauses were comparable,
meaning that they had to be treated as different. 
3. Elaboration: Some SNS elaborated on certain topics 
more than others. For example, although all SNS included a 
link to follow if users had any questions, comments or 
complaints, some also included their physical address and 
information regarding the complaints/question procedure.
Equally, SNS provided definitions and examples of varying 
length and content for technical terms. For example, only 
Pinterest and Twitter elaborated on the definition of 
cookies to mean ‘persistent’ and ‘session’ cookies, which 
resulted in additional clauses, not present in other policies. 
Clause Coverage 
Graph 1: Shows number of clauses covered by SNS 
Table 4: Jaccard Similarity of Clause Coverage 
4.2 Similarity in Recommendation Coverage 
Interestingly, Graph 2 shows that when looking at 
recommendation coverage, the largest percentages of 
recommendations covered, were for those covered by none 
(22.5%), or all six of the SNS (30%). These percentages 
show similarity between SNS in terms of the ICO Code 
recommendations that they do (and do not) address. Unlike 
Graph 1, there is no evidence of a power-law relationship in 
Graph 2 between the number of SNS and how many 
recommendations they address. Instead, the majority of 
recommendations were either addressed by all SNS, or 
none.  
Table 5 shows the similarity of SNS with the Code, ranges 
from 45-65%, which may be because the ICO Code 
Figure 1: Shows number of clauses covered by SNS
4.2 Similarity in Recommendation Coverage
Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that when looking at recommen-
dation coverage, the largest percentages of recommendations
covered, were for those covered by none (22.5%), or all six of
the SNS (30%). These percentages show similarity between
SNS in terms of the ICO Code recommendations that they do
(and do not) address. Unlike Figure 1, there is no evidence of
a power-law relationship in Figure 2 between the number of
SNS and how many recommendations they address. Instead,
the majority of recommendations were either addressed by all
SNS, or none.
Table 5 shows the similarity of SNS with the Code, ranges from
45-65%, which may be because the ICO Code recommendations
are based on UK and EU law, whereas the SNS are based in
the US. However, in answering research question 2 (Section 1),
Table 5 shows that similarity, between the SNS themselves in
addressing the code recommendations, ranges from 52%-81%.
This evid ces a higher p rcentag of similarity amongst the
SNS in the specific recommendations they addressed, than their
overall similarity with the ICO Code. These percentages cor-
roborate Figure 2, that there were certain recommendations
that SNS collectively did, or did not, address.
However, failing to address a recommendation and a lower
similarity with the ICO Code does not necessitate non-compliance
with it. Failing to cover a recommendation could be for one of
two reasons: because it was not applicable and thus the policy
would not need to address it, or because the recommendation
was applicable, but the SNS failed to address it. For example,
none of the SNS addressed the recommendation that ‘Where
individuals are required by law to provide personal details, be
open and explain why information is being collected and what it
will be used for’ i.e. none of the policies stated that individuals
were required by law to provide certain personal details. This
may be because individuals are not required by law to provide
SNS with personal details, or equally, because individuals are,
but SNS failed to address this in their policy. Which scenario
is correct cannot be ascertained without further investigation
and legal analysis, outside the scope of this paper, for the rea-
sons explained above. Such analysis would also require access
to information, which SNS often do not divulge in full, such as
recommendations are based on UK and EU law, whereas 
the SNS are based in the US. However, in answering
research question 2 (Section 1), Table 5 shows that 
similarity, between the SNS themselves in addressing the 
code recommendations, ranges from 52%-81%. This 
evidences a higher percentage of similarity amongst the 
SNS in the specific recommendations they addressed, than
their overall similarity with the ICO Code. These 
percentages corroborate Graph 2, that there were certain
recommendations that SNS collectively did, or did not, 
address. 
  
Graph 2: Shows number of recommendations covered by SNS 
Table 5: Jaccard Similarity in Covering Code 
Recommendations 
C FB P T F L G+ 
ICO Code (C)  0.58 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.65 0.65 
Facebook (FB) 0.52 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.63 
Pinterest (P) 0.76 0.61 0.52 0.69 
Twitter (T) 0.65 0.61 0.66 
Flickr (F) 0.66 0.61 
LinkedIn (L) 0.68 
Google+ (G+) 
However, failing to address a recommendation and a lower
similarity with the ICO Code does not necessitate non-
compliance with it. Failing to cover a recommendation 
could be for one of two reasons: because it was not 
applicable and thus the policy would not need to address it, 
or because the recommendation was applicable, but the 
SNS failed to address it. For example, none of the SNS 
addressed the recommendation that ‘Where individuals are 
required by law to provide personal details, be open and 
explain why information is being collected and what it will 
be used for’ i.e. none of the policies stated that individuals 
were required by law to provide certain personal details. 
This may be because individuals are not required by law to 
provide SNS with personal details, or equally, because 
individuals are, but SNS failed to address this in their 
policy. Which scenario is correct cannot be ascertained 
without further investigation and legal analysis, outside the 
scope of this paper, for the reasons explained above. Such 
analysis would also require access to information, which
SNS often do not divulge in full, such as what data the SNS 
collects. 
Table 5 also shows that the least similar (with each other) 
in addressing ICO Code recommendations were jointly 
Facebook and Pinterest (52%) and LinkedIn and Pinterest
(52%). The most similar were Facebook and LinkedIn 
(81%). Interestingly, Facebook and LinkedIn had the 
highest numbers of clauses (Table 3) and although Pinterest 
did not have the lowest, it did have the second lowest with 
only 21 more than Flickr, who had 66 (Table 3). This
indicates that the more clauses SNS have, the more ICO 
recommendations they are likely to share. However, as 
stated above, failing to address recommendations is not 
indicative of non-compliance, and therefore a lesser length
or lower similarity with the ICO Code should not be 
assumed to mean a less legally compliant policy. 
4.3 ICO Code Recommendations Not Present 
in Privacy Policies 
Analysis identified nine ICO Code recommendations not 
addressed by any of the SNS. These were as follows:
Try and predict whether you will be likely to do things
with it (the data) in future without drawing up a long 
list of future possible uses if you are unlikely to use it
for those purposes.  LinkedIn and Facebook were the
only SNS to touch on the future of the services, although 
not enough to address this recommendation. Facebook 
stated that:  ‘Granting us permission to use your
information not only allows us to provide Facebook as it
exists today, but it also allows us to provide you with 
innovative features and services we develop in the future 
that use the information we receive about you in new ways’.
Therefore, although this indicates that Facebook envisages 
there will be future uses of data, it does not specify what 
these may be, just that an individual has given permission 
for them. This is a particularly wide licence, lacking 
specificity on what these features may be. Facebook has a 
track record of such licences, with the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC) filing a complaint with the US 
FTC about this [13].
LinkedIn was more focused on the possibility that they
would collect new types of information in the future, rather 
than put data they have collected to new uses, stating that: 
‘LinkedIn is a dynamic, innovative environment, which
means we are always seeking to improve the services we
offer you. We often introduce new features, some of which 
may result in the collection of new information (for 
example, when the Endorsements feature launched, we 
began collecting information about skills for which 
Members were endorsed and the individuals who endorsed
Figure 2: Shows number of recommendations covered by SNS
C FB P T F L G+
ICO Code
(C)
0.58 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.65 0.65
Facebook
(FB)
0.52 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.63
Pinterest
(P)
0.76 0.61 0.52 0.69
Twitter
(T)
0.65 0.61 0.66
Flickr (F) 0.66 0.61
LinkedIn
(L)
0.68
Google+
(G+)
Table 5: Jaccard Similarity in Covering Code Recommendations
what data the SNS collects. Table 5 also shows that the least
similar (with each other) in addressing ICO Code recommenda-
tions were jointly Facebook and Pinterest (52%) and LinkedIn
and Pinterest (52%). The most similar were Facebook and
LinkedIn (81%). Interestingly, Facebook and LinkedIn had the
highest numbers of clauses (Table 3) and although Pinterest did
not have the lowest, it did have the second lowest with only 21
more than Flick , who had 66 (Table 3). This cates that
the more clauses SNS have, the more ICO recommendations
they are likely to share. However, as stated above, failing to
address recommendations is not indicative of non-compliance,
and therefore a lesser length or lower similarity with the ICO
Code should not be assumed to mean a less legally compliant
policy.
4.3 ICO Code Recommendations Not Present in Privacy
Policies
Analysis identified nine ICO Code recommendations not ad-
dressed by any of the SNS. These were as follows:
Try and predict whether you will be likely to do things
with it (the data) in future without drawing up a long
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list of future possible uses if you are unlikely to use it
for those purposes. LinkedIn and Facebook were the only
SNS to touch on the future of the services, although not enough
to address this recommendation. Facebook stated that: ‘Grant-
ing us permission to use your information not only allows us
to provide Facebook as it exists today, but it also allows us to
provide you with innovative features and services we develop in
the future that use the information we receive about you in new
ways’. Therefore, although this indicates that Facebook envis-
ages there will be future uses of data, it does not specify what
these may be, just that an individual has given permission for
them. This is a particularly wide licence, lacking specificity on
what these features may be. Facebook has a track record of
such licences, with the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) filing a complaint with the US FTC about this (Center.,
2015).
LinkedIn was more focused on the possibility that they
would collect new types of information in the future, rather
than put data they have collected to new uses, stating that:
‘LinkedIn is a dynamic, innovative environment, which means
we are always seeking to improve the services we offer you. We
often introduce new features, some of which may result in the
collection of new information (for example, when the Endorse-
ments feature launched, we began collecting information about
skills for which Members were endorsed and the individuals who
endorsed them). Furthermore, new partnerships or corporate
acquisitions may result in new features, and we may potentially
collect new types of information’.
About the right to complain to the Information
Commissioner if there is a problem. None of the SNS
mentioned the right to complain to the UK Information Com-
missioner. This is likely to be because this is the data protec-
tion authority for the UK, and it could be impractical for the
SNS to list the equivalent for every county using its service.
Furthermore, because of the aforementioned issues relating to
legal jurisdiction on the web, SNS users may not have the right
to complain to the Information Commissioner, or have an equiv-
alent. Interestingly, both Facebook and LinkedIn do refer to
California’s ‘Shine the Light law’, which is only applicable to
California residents. This may be because both are based in
California, even though it would certainly not be the only law
applicable.
Have separate notices aimed at different groups of
individuals you deal with. Each SNS only provided one pol-
icy (although versions in different languages were often avail-
able). This may be because it only deals with one ‘group’ of
individuals, as exactly what ‘group’ means is unclear. The ex-
ample given in the ICO Code is that a local authority may use
information about old age pensioners to administer free access
to local leisure facilities. Or use information about shopkeep-
ers to collect business taxes (Office., 2010). In this sense, this
recommendation may not apply to SNS, because they may not
have different uses for different user data, but use all user data
in the same ways.
Where individuals are required by law to provide
their personal details be open with people and explain
clearly why their information is being collected and
what it will be used for. None of the SNS addressed this. As
discussed earlier, this may be because there is no information
the SNS are required by law to obtain, or that there is, but
that the SNS has not included the details of this within their
policy.
In marketing contexts, when organisations ask for
permission to share customer information with third
parties e.g. companies in the same group, this should
be backed up with more detail information such as the
names of the companies involved for those who want
it. This is certainly applicable to the SNS and all discussed
sharing information with third parties, however the specific
third parties were not detailed. It may be that this information
was provided (and this recommendation addressed) on another
layer of the policy accessible by following a hyperlink. Or that
this is communicated at the time when permission is obtained
(although most SNS simply used their privacy policy as the
information provided prior to consent). Therefore, although it
can be concluded that it was not addressed in the first layer of
the policy, this information may have been available elsewhere.
Although, the practice of listing this information elsewhere is
questionable, given ICO’s guidance on key information being
in the first layer.
If an organisation intends to collect personal infor-
mation with the intention of selling or renting it you
should make it clear to individuals that the information
they provide could be supplied to anyone and used for
any purpose and tell them this when they provide their
details; and
That if their information is rented, individuals are
told that if the business is insolvent, bankrupt, being
closed down or sold that their information will be re-
turned to its owner.
None of the SNS addressed either of these. However, they all
discussed the transfer of information if the business is insolvent
etc. This may mean these recommendations do not apply be-
cause none of the SNS sell or rent information. However, with
companies like GNIP (GNIP., 2016) selling access to social me-
dia data from various SNS, specifically listing that access to
Twitter, Facebook, Flickr and Google+ data is available, this
is unlikely. Thus, for these four SNS at least, these recommen-
dations would appear to apply.
Avoid using confusing terminology e.g. technical
language. Pinterest, LinkedIn and Google all stated at the
beginning of their policy that they had tried to keep their poli-
cies as simple as possible. Pinterest acknowledged that some
of their terms were a little technical, and Google advised that
if readers were not familiar with terms like cookies etc. they
should read about them first. However, all policies used tech-
nical language, such as ‘cookies’, ‘API’ and ‘plugins’ etc., and
therefore arguably failed in addressing this recommendation.
The recommendation is to ‘avoid’ rather than ‘try to avoid’,
which is more akin to what the policies did. Some technical
language was used and then followed by an explanation of what
it meant. For example, Twitter, Facebook and Pintersest all
provided a definition of ‘cookies’. However, the term API was
often used without definition. It must be noted that complying
with this recommendation would prove almost impossible for
SNS, and websites in general. As Robinson, et al., (Robinson et
al., 2009) acknowledges, national laws require full descriptions
of data processing activities, which prove difficult to describe
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in a form the consumer can understand.
If you collect information from vulnerable individu-
als (such as children) have appropriate privacy notice
to their level of understanding – would they under-
stand the consequences? None of the SNS offered policies
aimed at vulnerable individuals, which could be because they
do not collect information from them. Pinterest, Twitter and
LinkedIn all stated that they had a minimum age to use their
site. Google and Flickr did not mention a minimum age in
their policy, which may be because they have a generic policy,
applicable to many services. Some services may be available
to children and some may not be. However, upon brief further
investigation (which will not change the results or scope of this
study but was merely meant to ascertain whether SNS should
have been providing notices specific to children), elsewhere on
its site, Google+ mentions a minimum age of 13 to use its ser-
vices and in Yahoo’s terms of service it states a minimum age of
13 to use the SNS provided by Yahoo. Despite having a specific
policy for its service, Facebook also stated that it had a min-
imum age of 13 in its terms of service rather than its privacy
policy. The common factor of the minimum age of 13 may be
because of the US FTC’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act 1998 (States., 1998 15 U.S.C. 6501–6505), which applies to
the online collection of personal information from children un-
der 13, and places additional requirements upon websites which
do. Stating a minimum age of 13 is a bold statement that the
website is not aimed at children, which the FTC will consider
during investigations. This indicates, that regarding children,
SNS may not be required to provide notices to their level of
understanding. However, there may be other vulnerable indi-
viduals that require an appropriate privacy policy, especially
given the amount of information, which an SNS can obtain.
Other vulnerable individuals could include those with mental
health or learning difficulties, over the age of 13. As all of the
SNS only had one privacy policy, despite being used by vul-
nerable individuals (Holmes and O’Loughlin, 2014), they are
certainly not in compliance with this recommendation.
4.4 Themes of Information Addressed by All Privacy
Policies and Not Included in the Code
As mentioned in Section 3.5, if a clause was not allocated to
an ICO Code recommendation, then it was placed into a cat-
egory of ‘miscellaneous’. Inductive thematic analysis of these
clauses identified four themes, which appeared in all six privacy
policies, but not in the ICO Code.
The Process of Updating the Privacy Policy
Whilst the code mentions that policies should be regularly re-
viewed, it does not advise that websites should include the pro-
cess of doing so, or involve users in this process. However, all
SNS mentioned something about their process of revising the
policy, with some mentioning more than others. In particular
Facebook was very detailed:
‘If we make changes to this Data Use Policy we will notify
you (for example, by publication here and on the Facebook Site
Governance Page). If the changes are material, we will provide
you additional, prominent notice as appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. You can make sure that you receive notice directly
by liking the Facebook Site Governance Page. . .Unless we make
a change for legal or administrative reasons, or to correct an in-
accurate statement, we will give you seven (7) days to provide
us with comments on the change. After the comment period,
if we adopt any changes, we will provide notice (for example,
on the Facebook Site Governance Page or in this policy) of the
effective date’.
The detail Facebook provided may be linked with the fact that
they had the largest number of clauses, as length did not ap-
pear to be a concern. Or it could be due to the criticism they
have received regarding previous revisions of their policy (An-
derson, 2009). Either way, this theme of detailing the process
of updating the policy was common to all six SNS.
Functionality
As mentioned in relation to research question one, a large num-
ber of clauses were used to explain the functionality of SNS.
This was often required to explain the purpose for using or shar-
ing information. For example, both Facebook and LinkedIn
had to explain Platform technology (an underlying system on
which application programs can run) in order to explain who
they share information with through it, and the purpose of this.
Technically, the SNS could fulfill the Code’s recommendations
without explaining their functionality in detail. However, ex-
plaining these functionalities and their role in the collection,
use and sharing of personal data can provide the contextual in-
formation, which makes policies more informative and enables
users make decisions regarding their personal data.
List of Personal Data Collected
Interestingly, the Code does not mention that organizations
should list exactly what personal data they collect, despite
requiring that they state the purpose of obtaining, using and
disclosing it. However, this was clearly present in some form in
all of the SNS, who provide descriptions of what information
they collect. For example, photos, associated metadata, mes-
sages, responses to ads etc. This may not have been included
in the Code because it is not solely aimed at SNS, or even web-
sites, but governs data collection both online and oﬄine. In the
oﬄine context of filling in a questionnaire, an individual may
be aware of what information they are providing, as they write
it down. However, online users may not be so aware of what
information is collected, especially as ‘increasing amounts of
data are not collected from the individuals concerned, but are
instead observed, derived and inferred’ (Economic Cooperation
et al., 2014). Thus, it is impossible for SNS to be transparent
about data processing without talking about this in some form.
How They Receive Information
Another theme present only in the policies is how the data
is received e.g. through friends, through a users computer etc.
Again, this may be for the same reason as above, that the Code
is not aimed specifically at online contexts, where the sources of
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information are not as transparent and users may not be aware
of how information is collected (Economic Cooperation et al.,
2014). However, providing this information clearly makes data
processing more transparent.
5 Discussion
It is only by combining the answers to the first four research
questions, that an understanding of their implications regard-
ing the ‘bigger picture’ of privacy policies can be understood,
and the fifth research question (about the extent to which stan-
dardization is possible) can be answered. Research question
one indicated that there is not a lot of similarity between the
privacy policies in the clauses that they use, with similarity
ranging between 8-27%. Although there were common clauses
that could be drawn out, a power-law relationship existed be-
tween the number of common clauses and the number of SNS.
This meant that there were only a small percentage of clauses
shared by all six SNS, with the majority of clauses bespoke
to one SNS. From looking at this alone, one would conclude
that the similarity between SNS is so low that standardization
seems, if not impossible, definitely a long way off. Much work
would be required to create the level of similarity required for
standardization by clause.
However, research question two showed that if you look at
similarity in terms of themes of information addressed, rather
than specific clauses used to do so, the similarity between SNS
is far higher, ranging from 52-81%. This indicates that SNS
express similar themes of information, but in different ways.
This indicates that standardization is not as impossible as re-
search question one suggests. Indeed, it was noted that in rela-
tion to research question one, the differences in clause coverage
were largely due to differences in functionality, semantics and
amounts of elaboration between SNS. By looking at similarity
in terms of theme, these differences are not as influential, par-
ticularly in relation to the semantics of the language used and
the amount of elaboration. For example, if one SNS used ten
clauses to address a recommendation and another SNS used
two, with differing language, they have both still addressed the
same theme.
Research questions two and three also showed that there
were recommendations that every SNS addressed and recom-
mendations that were addressed by none. However, it cannot
be assumed that failure in addressing a recommendation is due
to a SNS failing or choosing not to, as the particular recommen-
dation may not be relevant to the SNS. Furthermore, some rec-
ommendations were almost impossible to comply with in the
context of SNS, such as the recommendation to ‘avoid using
confusing terminology’. Because of the technical functionality
of SNS, to properly convey what information will be used or
disclosed for, a level of technical language is required.
Research question four showed a number of themes present
in all the policies, which were not recommendations in the ICO
Code. However, these clearly provided additional information
to users regarding their privacy and personal data. One reason
for this may be that the Code was not aimed exclusively at
online environments and therefore, makes assumptions about
people’s awareness of the information they provide. Further-
more, its age may also attribute to this. Dated December 2010,
the Code is currently under review and in the process of being
updated. It will be interesting to see whether the final updated
version includes any of these themes.
So, whilst research question three shows that the ICO Code
provides a number of themes, which are present in the poli-
cies, it cannot be treated as an exhaustive list of what should
be included in a policy, when all stakeholders are considered.
Therefore, when looking to standardize policies of SNS or other
types of website, a thorough examination should include the rel-
evant policies, to ascertain a full list of themes, in addition to
examining other sources.
6 Recommendations
Therefore, the outcomes of this investigation indicate that stan-
dardization is possible, albeit at a thematic level currently. It
is also only possible if the issues raised are addressed. Moving
forward, five initial recommendations are made to facilitate
this:
1. Begin with an asexhaustiveaspossible list of themes,
which a SNS should address, rather than focus-
ing on clauses initially. Because the investigation
showed high similarity between the policies in the ICO
Code recommendations they covered, SNS policies are
already in a better position to begin to be standardized
by theme. This could form a visually familiar table for
users as a first step, consisting of two columns, with the
list of standardized themes in a standardized order on
the left. The SNS clauses can then be allocated to those
themes on the right. In addition to looking at the legal
requirements and the advice of data protection author-
ities to create this list of themes, the privacy policies
should also be examined as a source from which themes
can be gleaned.
2. General functionality and functionality specific
to that website should appear as separate themes.
A theme of general functionality would include function-
ality common to all websites and the data collection and
use associated with this (such as log data). Website-
specific functionality would include functionality that
the SNS offer and use above that minimum. Then users
could easily identify differences between SNS, by looking
at the website-specific functionality theme, in addition
to familiarizing themselves with standard processing in
the general functionality theme.
3. Definitions, explanations and examples of tech-
nical terms should be standardized so that each
policy uses the same ones. For example, when re-
ferring to ‘cookies’ there should be a set, approved defi-
nition, explanation and example of a cookie. Given that
it is almost impossible to avoid using technical terms in
relation to describing the activities of SNS, at least by
doing this, the amount or type of information a user
gets in this context will not vary with the SNS they use.
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This will lessen confusion and possibly support familiar-
ity with definitions and examples.
4. Certain words should also be standardized. For
example, close, delete and deactivate should not be used
interchangeably, but either one word is used, or their
individual (but separate) definitions (in relation to ter-
minating an account) should be standardized i.e. close
account always means one thing, as does delete account.
This would also lessen confusion and increase transparency.
5. Make sure that when standardizing, there is a
way for users to easily ascertain when a theme
is not addressed and why. As mentioned, if an ICO
Code recommendation was not addressed it was unclear
whether this was because it was not applicable, or be-
cause the SNS simply failed to do so. Fulfilling this
recommendation would solve this issue, making SNS jus-
tifications clear to users, regulators and researchers and
evidencing that they have considered all the applicable
requirements when constructing a privacy policy.
7 Limitations
One limitation is that this investigation only looks at the poli-
cies at a single point in time (August 2014), and whilst other
comparative analyses have been discussed (Section 2.5), these
did not compare the policies for the same elements as this inves-
tigation. This makes it difficult to provide information on the
evolution of privacy policies at different points in time. How-
ever, this investigation has provided the starting point for fu-
ture work, which could repeat this investigation on the policies
as they change, to allow for a discussion on the evolution of pri-
vacy policies. Another limitation of the investigation is that the
coding and analysis in Stages 1-5 was completed by one person
and then discussed with the other researchers. Whilst this pro-
vided methodological consistency, coding in parallel could have
enriched the work by providing multiple perspectives. There-
fore, future work could conduct inter-rater reliability or intra-
rater reliability on the findings. Furthermore, as discussed in
Section 3.2, we chose to focus on the first layer of the policies
for various pragmatic reasons. This could have impacted the
findings, because the nine ICO recommendations that we did
not find addressed in the ‘first layer’ of the policies could have
been found in these further layers. Future work could extend
this analysis to all layers of the policies on the same domain,
to conclude whether certain elements have been addressed at
all. This analysis could include a full legal analysis of what
the implications of these exceptions are, whether the SNS are
in contravention with the code, and whether it is appropriate
that this information is not in the first layer of the policies.
8 Conclusion and Future Works
In conclusion, this paper proposes that the privacy policies
of SNS demonstrate homogeneity and promising potential for
standardization, at a thematic level initially. In answering re-
search question one; analysis initially showed that similarity
between the policies in the clauses they used was low. However,
analysis of a second attribute showed that similarity between
SNS was far higher in the themes of information addressed. Re-
search question three showed that there were some ICO Code
recommendations which none of the SNS addressed, but re-
search question four showed that the policies included extra
material, beyond the Code’s recommendations. This analysis
enabled us to conclude that the policies share attributes re-
quired for standardization to be possible, albeit on a thematic
level initially.
To support this standardization in practice, the recommen-
dations made in Section 6 could be followed up with further
work on how to put these into action and standardize policies
on a thematic level. For example, computer supported algo-
rithms could be used to test whether this standardization can
take place in practice, and by computers opposed to manually.
Whilst this is outside the scope of this study, which sought to
provide the starting point for this type of work, tests such as
these would be valuable future work.
Indeed, by following the recommendations in Section 6,
SNS could begin standardizing their policies by theme. Fol-
lowing this level of standardization, further levels could be ex-
plored, such as standardizing some of the clauses, or the spe-
cific information to be provided within themes. For example,
the Code recommendation of detailing ‘Who to contact if they
want to complain or know about how their information will
be used’, could be standardized so that organizations have to
provide the same specific information, like: telephone number;
written address; email address etc. Furthermore, although stan-
dardization by clause is not currently feasible, overcoming the
differences in functionality, semantics and elaboration with the
Section 6 recommendations would allow for another assessment
of similarity. This could investigate the potential for standard-
ization by clause.
To make sure this standardized policy legally compliant
(opposed to just re-arranging the policies in a standardized
order), further investigations could seek to understand the rea-
sons why some ICO Code recommendations were not addressed.
It could also seek to understand whether the extra themes the
policies discussed should be (or are) legal requirements. This
could include investigating why they are not mentioned in the
ICO Code. Once this is completed, a standardized policy for
compliance by SNS with UK law could be created. As men-
tioned this will give indications for compliance with EU law,
but will not be completely generalizable to all EU member
states. Although, the DPD is being updated and replaced by
the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Com-
mission., 2016), which will be directly applicable in all EU
member states without implementation. Therefore, this study
could be replicated, but based on the GDPR’s requirements,
as the direct applicability of the GDPR means that the results
would be generalizable to all EU member states. Furthermore,
because this was an initial study, testing whether there was
similarity between US policies with UK (based on EU) law,
the ICO Code provided the most appropriate set of recommen-
dations. However, extensions of this work could also measure
similarity against thematic codes from other legal jurisdictions,
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or a superset of legal requirements from multiple jurisdictions.
This would begin work towards a global standardized privacy
policy. Standardizing the privacy policies of SNS would be
a major success for individual management of personal data
online. Our work demonstrates the potential for this at a the-
matic level currently, and we hope it will result in a step closer
to the standardization of privacy policies of SNS in the future.
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